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Recent Developments

SNOWDEN v. STATE OF MARYLAND:

Introduction of Testimonial Hearsay Statements Made by an
Available Witness who Does Not Testify Violates the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause
By: Lama Cutter
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the
introduction of testimonial hearsay statements made by an available
witness who does not testify violates the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. Snowden v. State, 156 Md. App. 139, 846 A.2d
36 (2004). In so holding, the court ruled that a social worker's
testimony encompassing statements from children she previously
interviewed, who did not testify, were barred from being introduced
against the children's alleged abuser. Id.
In late January 2002, three young girls, all under the age of
twelve, told their mothers that Michael Snowden ("Snowden")
touched them inappropriately. Snowden adamantly denied the
accusations. The police were notified of the incidents and Snowden
was arrested. During police questioning, Snowden wrote letters of
apology to the children, explaining that he never intended to touch
them improperly. Snowden was later charged with six counts of third
degree sexual offense and one count of child abuse. Eleven days after
the arrest, Amira Abdul-Wakeel, a social worker employed by the
Child Protective Services Division of the Montgomery County
Department of Health and Human Services, interviewed the three
children.
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion pursuant to MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304, to introduce Abdul-Wakeel's testimony
in place of the children's testimony. Snowden objected to AbdulWakeel's testimony on the ground that the testimony would violate
his right of confrontation, but the circuit court overruled his objection.
Snowden was convicted of all charges, then filed an appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Snowden challenged the
constitutionality of section 11-304 and the trial court's admission of
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Abdul-Wakeel's testimony. Snowden also alleged that there was
insufficient evidence to prove he touched the girls for the purpose of
sexual arousal.
The court of special appeals first noted the implications of the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, specifically a criminal
defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying
against them. ld. at 149-50, 846 A.2d at 42-43. The court recognized
that hearsay statements may be introduced without violating a
defendant's rights when the statement is either a firmly rooted
hearsay exception or has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
ld. at 150, 846 A.2d at 43.
The Maryland Legislature responded to the particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness exception by enacting section 11-304,
also known as the "tender years statute." ld. at 151, 846 A.2d at 44.
section 11-304 permits hearsay declarations to be introduced
regardless of whether the child testifies. ld. at 146, 846 A.2d at 40. If
the child does not testify, however, section 11-304 requires the
existence of corroborative evidence that the defendant had the
opportunity to commit the alleged crime. ld. In determining whether
a statement contains particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,
section 11-304 mandates that a court evaluate thirteen factors,
interview the child, then record a finding specifically stating the
statement's guarantees of trustworthiness. ld. at 151, 846 A.2d at 43.
In this case, the court, without explanation, was satisfied that the
circuit court completed the statutory procedures. ld. at 151, 846 A.2d
at 44.
Before reaching a conclusion, the court recognized the
mandates of witness unavailability and previous opportunity for
cross examination that were established by the recent Supreme Court
case, Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Snowden, 156 Md.
App. at 156, 846 A.2d at 46. In Crawford, the defendant's conviction
was reversed based on the violation of his confrontation rights. ld. at
153-54, 846 A.2d at 44. The trial judge allowed police officers to testify
about disclosures made to them by the defendant's wife. ld. at 153,
846 A.2d at 45 (discussing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358). The trial court
in Crawford found the statements contained particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness, but the Washington Court of Appeals disagreed
and reversed the conviction. Snowden, 156 Md. at 153, 846 A.2d at 45.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed by concurring
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with the trial court's finding of trustworthiness. Id. Crawford
challenged the conviction's reinstatement and appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Id.
The United States Supreme Court, in Crawford, distinguished
two types of out-of-court statements: "those that are 'testimonial' and
those that are not." Id. at ISS, 846 A.2d at 46. Simplistically reasoned,
testimonial statements violate the Confrontation Clause because the
Confrontation Clause only deals with testimony. Id. Although the
court never provided a concrete list of testimonial or non-testimonial
statements, it did consider ex parte in-court testimony, or its
equivalent (Le. affidavits, custodial examinations) and "extrajudicial
statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions" to be
testimonial statements. Id. at 155 n.26, 846 A.2d at 46.
In the case at bar, the court of special appeals found AbdulWakeel's statements to be testimonial, and therefore, they violated the
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 157, 846 A.2d at 47. The court reasoned
the children were only interviewed with the purpose of developing
Abdul-Wakeel's testimony. Id. Further, the court noted that the State
did not establish that the children were unavailable to testify, and as
such, failed to satisfy Crawford's foundational requirements of the
declarant's unavailability and the accused's prior opportunity for
cross-examination. Id. at 157 n.31, 846 A.2d at 47. The court, in
examining whether section 11-304 violated the Confrontation Clause,
only stated that
when
the
admissibility
of
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, the
individual states are entitled to
determine what statements should be
admitted and what statements should
be excluded, but when testimonial
evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common
law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross examination.
Id. at 156-57~ 846 A.2d at 47.
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Finally, the court held that sufficient evidence did exist to
convict Snowden of child abuse and third-degree sexual offense. Id.
at 158, 846 A.2d at 48. The court noted the facts of the case. First, the
children were interviewed by Abdul-Wakeel only in regards to a child
sexual abuse case, pursuant to statutory provisions. Id. Second, the
children believed they were improperly touched by Snowden,
regardless of whether the incidents actually occurred. Id. at 159, 846
A.2d at 48. Third, Snowden was arrested and voluntarily wrote
letters of apology to the children, which indicated the incidents did
occur in the manner and locations Abdul-Wakeel described. Id. at
159,846 A.2d at 48-49. Finally, Snowden, by writing the letters, hoped
the children, or more importantly, their mothers, would accept his
apology and forgo pursuing the charges. Id.
Accordingly, the court explored the issue of double jeopardy
and concluded that when an appellate court reverses on the basis of
an erroneous admission of hearsay testimony, rather than on the basis
of insufficient evidence, the accused is entitled to a new trial. Id. at
161,846 A.2d at 50 (See State v. Boone, 284 Md. 1,393 A.2d 1361 (1978)).
Hence, the court remanded the case and ordered a new trial, which
barred the introduction of Abdul-Wakeel's testimony. Id. at 161-:62,
846 A.2d at 50.
In Snowden v. State, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
clearly followed the new requirements concerning hearsay
declarations set by Crawford v. Washington. Maryland courts must
follow the rigid preconditions of the declarant's unavailability and the
accused's prior opportunity for cross-examination in order to allow
the introduction of hearsay testimony without violating the accused's
Sixth Amendment rights. Because of these prerequisites, and because
the court failed to formally address whether section 11-304 was
unconstitutional, Maryland may now have to reconsider its
evidentiary guidelines. Consequently, in order to comply with the
recent federal transformation in evidentiary rules, Maryland may
have to either revise section 11-304 or propose a new statute to replace
section 11-304 altogether.

Editor's Note: The Court of Appeals 0/ Maryland heard the State's
appeal on December 3, 2004. This journal will report on that decision
in Volume 35.2, which will be published in the spring 0/2005.
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